'Hawks versus Doves', no, it has nothing to do with NHL play offs, although to some degree it is a play off of an evolutionary type, I suppose and describes the various strategies employed by species to better guarantee survival. In the instant case, it has to do with assessment of behaviours in an effort to prevail in survival but this will become even more clear after I attempt to describe the phenomenon.
Survival is all about gaining access to food sources, securing a habitat that is secure and thus permitting reproduction to increase the chances of survival and ultimately maintain population density. Organisms behaviour is a complex combination of strategies with the end result being to promote survival.
If all members participate in a particular strategy, it’s referred to as “optimum”. However, if some strategies are not universally practiced, then what emerges are competing strategies that can be present at various times and at various levels. The evolution of this range of strategies that are not universally accepted sets the playing field, as it were. Game strategy employed in the human arena requires that we are aware of our opponent’s behaviour or tactics. An entirely new means of interpreting organisms’ behaviour emerged when Maynard Smith posed that successful reproduction and resultant survival involved similar game strategy.
Let’s consider the following example where there are two distinct behavioural strategies at play. 'Hawks' prevail over their opponents through aggression, by fighting and killing them. Although this is a successful approach to command control over resources and habitat, there is some risk involved. After all, some individuals will be lost in battle ~ yes, through aggression some hawks can be mortally injured. On the other hand, 'Doves' adopt a more pacificist role and rarely engage in combat, but choose a display type strategy to achieve their ends.
Survival is all about gaining access to food sources, securing a habitat that is secure and thus permitting reproduction to increase the chances of survival and ultimately maintain population density. Organisms behaviour is a complex combination of strategies with the end result being to promote survival.
If all members participate in a particular strategy, it’s referred to as “optimum”. However, if some strategies are not universally practiced, then what emerges are competing strategies that can be present at various times and at various levels. The evolution of this range of strategies that are not universally accepted sets the playing field, as it were. Game strategy employed in the human arena requires that we are aware of our opponent’s behaviour or tactics. An entirely new means of interpreting organisms’ behaviour emerged when Maynard Smith posed that successful reproduction and resultant survival involved similar game strategy.
Let’s consider the following example where there are two distinct behavioural strategies at play. 'Hawks' prevail over their opponents through aggression, by fighting and killing them. Although this is a successful approach to command control over resources and habitat, there is some risk involved. After all, some individuals will be lost in battle ~ yes, through aggression some hawks can be mortally injured. On the other hand, 'Doves' adopt a more pacificist role and rarely engage in combat, but choose a display type strategy to achieve their ends.
Now let’s consider that all members of a particular population and species choose to employ the 'Dove' strategy. Things appear quite peaceful until a member adopting the 'Hawk' strategy enters the arena, and being a fighter, he’d likely champion over the passive non-combative 'Doves'.
Reversing the hypothesis, if all members adopted the role of 'Hawks', there’d be a lot of fighting, and some resultant mortality, but since the 'Dove' strategy involves little fighting, while the 'Hawks' were fighting each other, those that adopted the 'Dove' strategy would prosper. The end result being a mixture of both 'Doves' and 'Hawks' with an equilibrium reached when pay offs for each strategy were equal. Thus an Evolutionary Stable State.
Now let's add another element, that of the choice of behaviour. A strategy like this which is stable and has choice built into it is called an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. It differs from an Evolutionary Stable State because it an individual in the population can make a choice, and natural selection has determined the frequency with which each behaviour (choice) occurs within the strategy.
Of course, the whole concept Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) can only work if the individuals participating are able to determine the pay offs for the various strategies. Going back to the interaction between 'Hawks' and 'Doves', if each individual could assess when it would be best to play 'Hawk' versus when it is more appropriate to behave like a 'Dove' it would create an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) where the choice of which behaviour to exhibit has been made based upon assessment. Within species, individuals adopt alternative competing strategies with frequencies that reflect the success of each strategy. Evolutionary Stable Strategies occur when alternative competing strategies are at equilibrium.
I'm not going to go into the various types of Evolutionary Stable Strategies that can occur, because quite frankly, my understanding of this is limited, but one such strategy, known as 'Bourgeois' strategy. With Bourgeois, whose central feature is that ownership of a resource determines the behaviour used in a particular contest. If a Bourgeois strategist owns, it will defend its ownership with 'Hawk-like' ferocity; if a Bourgeois employing individual does not own, it will attempt to obtain the resource using display that does not escalate to fighting. Simply put, play 'Hawk-like' when an owner of a resource and exhibit 'Dove-like' behaviour when an intruder'.
OK, I'm sure you're wondering, how does the apply to this sequence of events? This assessment-related behaviour common in species is no different than that employed by our own human species. We assess a situation and determine which behaviour to adopt in order to gain access to a resource. This will become more clear as I relate the series of episodes that occurred in September 2005.
Reversing the hypothesis, if all members adopted the role of 'Hawks', there’d be a lot of fighting, and some resultant mortality, but since the 'Dove' strategy involves little fighting, while the 'Hawks' were fighting each other, those that adopted the 'Dove' strategy would prosper. The end result being a mixture of both 'Doves' and 'Hawks' with an equilibrium reached when pay offs for each strategy were equal. Thus an Evolutionary Stable State.
Now let's add another element, that of the choice of behaviour. A strategy like this which is stable and has choice built into it is called an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. It differs from an Evolutionary Stable State because it an individual in the population can make a choice, and natural selection has determined the frequency with which each behaviour (choice) occurs within the strategy.
Of course, the whole concept Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) can only work if the individuals participating are able to determine the pay offs for the various strategies. Going back to the interaction between 'Hawks' and 'Doves', if each individual could assess when it would be best to play 'Hawk' versus when it is more appropriate to behave like a 'Dove' it would create an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) where the choice of which behaviour to exhibit has been made based upon assessment. Within species, individuals adopt alternative competing strategies with frequencies that reflect the success of each strategy. Evolutionary Stable Strategies occur when alternative competing strategies are at equilibrium.
I'm not going to go into the various types of Evolutionary Stable Strategies that can occur, because quite frankly, my understanding of this is limited, but one such strategy, known as 'Bourgeois' strategy. With Bourgeois, whose central feature is that ownership of a resource determines the behaviour used in a particular contest. If a Bourgeois strategist owns, it will defend its ownership with 'Hawk-like' ferocity; if a Bourgeois employing individual does not own, it will attempt to obtain the resource using display that does not escalate to fighting. Simply put, play 'Hawk-like' when an owner of a resource and exhibit 'Dove-like' behaviour when an intruder'.
OK, I'm sure you're wondering, how does the apply to this sequence of events? This assessment-related behaviour common in species is no different than that employed by our own human species. We assess a situation and determine which behaviour to adopt in order to gain access to a resource. This will become more clear as I relate the series of episodes that occurred in September 2005.
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